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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army and the British Army are undergoing similar processes of rebalancing between regular
and reserve personnel. The British armed forces are
currently at a more advanced stage of this change than
the United States, and consequently there are useful
lessons to be drawn from their experience to date. This
is particularly the case in a time of growing defense
austerity; in addition to their smaller scale, the United
Kingdom’s (UK) armed forces have great familiarity
with undertaking missions and maintaining close to
full-spectrum capability while subject to severe and
apparently insurmountable resource constraints.
Studying how this is made possible may also provide
valuable pointers for a U.S. defense force in an era of
sequestration and budget cuts.
This monograph presents research by Dr. Shima
Keene, a defense analyst with extensive experience of
working both with and within the UK’s Reserve Forces. Dr. Keene identifies areas where the U.S. Army
and other services can potentially benefit from examining the UK’s comparable program of reserve reform.
Equally important, she identifies key areas where aspects of this reform have been entirely counterproductive, and points to specific and expensive recent British mistakes which it is essential for the U.S. military
to avoid.
The Strategic Studies Institute considers that this
monograph provides a useful view of prior experi-
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ence in organizing and integrating reserve forces, and
is a valuable addition to the debate on how to plan the
future shape of the U.S. Army.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In the current age of economic austerity, there is increasing pressure for the military in the United States
and the United Kingdom (UK) to be streamlined, so as
to be able to deliver more for less cost. This requires
a whole new approach to warfare supported by additional skill sets, many of which are not currently
readily or widely available within the military. These
skills have become even more vital in the current security environment of networked global insecurities.
As such, there is a need for the military not only to
re-establish lost skills, but to develop new skills to enhance its ability to tackle the emerging security threats
of the 21st century.
One way in which such skills shortages can be addressed is by accessing existing skill sets within the
civilian workforce, which can be achieved through
the recruitment of reservists. Reservists have been utilized not only by the U.S. Army, but also by numerous
armies around the world, including the UK, where the
reliance on Reservists has increased significantly in
recent years. However, recent reviews carried out by
the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) identified a range
of deficiencies highlighting the need for UK Reserve
Forces to be modernized so that they can be utilized in
a manner that is efficient, cost effective, and sustainable. Consequently, this monograph explores the various types of reservist roles and deployment options,
as well as factors that are both detrimental and beneficial to the recruitment, retention, and use of Reservists, highlighting areas where the UK experience is of
potential relevance to the U.S. Army’s future options.
It is recognized that U.S. Reserve Forces are bigger,
better funded, and more integrated with the Regular
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Army compared to the UK. However, there are also
many similarities between the two forces, such that
the cross-fertilization of experiences can be of mutual
benefit. For example, both the United States and the
UK have suffered the effects of the economic downturn, one side effect has been the need to cut defense
spending. As a result, each has recently made a decision to reduce the size of its Regular Army, compensating for the reduction by a greater reliance on the use
of Reserve Forces. This decision has met with criticism
in both the United States and the UK, with many questioning the extent to which reservists can be used to
“replace” regular forces. Some have expressed serious
concern regarding over-reliance on Reserve Forces,
viewing this as potentially weakening and endangering defense capabilities as a whole.
On the other hand, others have argued that such
concerns are not based on evidential data, but instead
on prejudice, and that it is the culture of the Regular
Army that needs to be addressed. This debate has encouraged further research and analysis into numerous
aspects of Reserve Forces so that an assessment can
be made as to the validity of the concerns expressed.
In order to contribute to this assessment, the aim of
this monograph is to highlight the lessons learned
by the UK Reserve Forces, both in terms of successes
and challenges, as well as to explore the feasibility
of achieving the proposals set out by Future Reserves
2020. This may be useful for the United States moving
forward as the need to cut defense spending further is
likely, and the UK may serve as a good model of how
to operate with a smaller budget. The assessments are
intended to assist the United States to consider the
successful elements of the UK model and its reform
program, while avoiding the errors and unintended
detrimental consequences identified.
x

One case study, with a focus on the use of reservists
with specialist skills, examines the use of medical professionals such as doctors. Another examines the use
of subject matter experts through the recently established Specialist Group Military Intelligence (SGMI)
unit, whose principal strength is its ability to utilize
the breadth of Reservist capability to provide a depth
of expertise to the Field Army, defense, and the wider
government that would be both uneconomical and
untimely to develop within a regular unit; and prohibitively expensive to contract from the private sector.
In addition, negative outcomes of reform processes in
the UK are highlighted, in particular the disastrous effect on recruitment and retention of outsourcing key
programs to the private sector. The analysis provided
leads to recommendations to enhance the overall capability and utility of the U.S. Armed Forces; better
harness the talents and the volunteer ethos of the U.S.
population; provide the U.S. Army with better integration with, and understanding by, the society from
which its manpower is drawn; and improve the costeffectiveness of defense.
ENDNOTES
1. In the UK system, DCEs are nongovernment civilians who
are available for deployment, often at short notice, for assignments in countries affected by or at risk of violent conflict. They
are part of the CSG, which is a pool of skilled individuals who are
deployed to fragile and conflict-affected countries to assist the UK
Government in addressing instability.
2. The Stabilisation Unit is an interdepartmental agency of
the UK government, jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development,
and the MoD.
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THE EFFECTIVE USE OF RESERVE PERSONNEL
IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
RESERVE MODEL
INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, the U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) militaries possessed robust expertise on
the culture and decisionmaking processes of potential
adversaries, in the form of numerous linguists and
foreign area officers whose purpose was, in part, to
study foreign countries and to prepare for possible
deployments to various continents. However, due to
the past 10 years of constant operational deployments,
this critical capability has been diminished. In the existing security environment, such international relations capability is essential not only in understanding
the developing threat environment, but to serve as an
early warning system and means of identifying issues
and problems before any potential need for military
intervention arises.
In addition, there is a need for the military to develop and sustain a new range of skill sets in order
to better understand and tackle today’s highly technical, globalized, and complex security threat environment. To keep up to speed and attempt to stay ahead
of emerging threats, the deployment of a new breed
of soldier who is a specialist/subject matter expert
(SME) in a range of necessary disciplines is vital. As
such, there is an immediate need for both the U.S. and
British Army to address existing skills shortages, both
in terms of the re-establishment of “foreign relations”
skills which have diminished over the last decade, as
well as developing new additional skills essential for
the battlefield of the 21st century.
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One solution is for the military to better access
and utilize existing relevant civilian skills through
the recruitment of Reservists who have developed the
necessary skill sets outside the military environment.
Reservists are able to provide additional capacity as
well as to make available specialist expertise which
would not be practical or cost effective to maintain as
a regular capability. In recognition of these challenges,
the UK Reserve Forces are in the process of undergoing a radical change in an attempt to professionalize
and make better use of their Reservists.
UK VERSUS U.S. RESERVE FORCES
U.S. Reserve Forces are larger, better funded, and
represent a larger ratio of the whole force compared
to the UK Reserve Forces. For example, the U.S. Army
Reserves and the U.S. Army National Guard form 20
percent1 and 32 percent,2 respectively, of total Army
Personnel, representing a combined total of just over
half of the U.S. Army, compared to the proposed 27
percent3 which the UK is hoping to achieve. The U.S.
Reserve Forces are also better integrated with their
regular counterpart, in that the “Total Force” concept4
was adopted shortly after the end of large-scale U.S.
military involvement in Vietnam in 1973,5 whereas the
concept is only just in the process of being established
in the UK. Nevertheless, there are numerous similarities, especially in terms of challenges that both countries face. For example, both have suffered the effects
of the economic downturn resulting in the need to cut
defense spending. As a result, both the United States
and the UK have recently decided to reduce the size of
their Regular Army.

2

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno announced in June 2013 that the Regular Army would
downsize the number of Brigade Combat Teams from
45 to 33, reducing the number of Soldiers from 570,000
to 490,000 by 2017.6 In addition, U.S. Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel has recommended shrinking forces even
further, to between 440,000 and 450,000, making the
total cut in personnel between 120,000 and 130,000.7
Similarly in the UK, British forces are undergoing a
20 percent reduction in Regular Army numbers from
102,000 to 82,000, to be implemented between 2010 and
2018.8 However, this cut has been compensated by the
proposed increase and better use of Reserve Forces. In
addition, the UK’s Territorial Army was rebranded as
the “Army Reserve” in an attempt to move away from
its previous ambiguous reputation as part-time soldiers or “weekend warriors,” and adopt a more professional image to reflect its actual role and function.
In the United States, although the budget for its
Reserve Forces has been reduced, the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) 2012 strategic guidance stated that
the impact of the defense cuts on Reserve Forces and
the National Guard would be minimal. Furthermore,
General Odierno confirmed in January 2012 that the
decision to cut the active force by 80,000 Soldiers
would place even greater reliance on the National
Guard and Reserves than ever before.9
There are four key arguments supporting the use
of Reserves.

3

Rationale for the Use of Reserves.
Skill Set:
The world today faces a diverse range of security
risks resulting in strategic uncertainties. These challenges can only be countered by an agile military organization with appropriate skill sets to meet these
challenges. In addition, the fast evolving nature of the
threat environment is such that it is unrealistic that
all of the necessary skills could be available on a fulltime basis. As such, it makes sense to utilize civilian
talent and skills if and when required through the use
of Reservists.
Deployability:
Reserve Forces are deployable. This is particularly
relevant in the context of specialist knowledge (See
“Specialists” section on succeeding pages. Case study
on Specialist Group Military Intelligence) where an
SME is required. Such expertise can often be found
within civilian government employees, but these are
not a deployable resource.
Cost:
Affordability is often a dominant argument put
forward in relation to the use of Reserve Forces. There
are considerable cost implications to developing additional specialist skill sets required in-house. In addition to the cost of training days payable to the Soldier,
the cost of hiring specialist teaching staff, as well as
providing facilities such as classrooms, training materials, travel, accommodation, and subsistence needs
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to be considered. On the other hand, as “specialist/
expert” Reservists have already developed the necessary skills, all that is required is the provision of remedial training to enable skills to be transferred for use
in the military environment. This not only results in
considerable savings but also presents excellent value
in terms of continued use of that expertise.
For example, in the UK, a clinical toxicologist takes
over 10 years to train and would usually bill at a daily
rate of £1,200 ($2,000),10 reflecting the availability of
approximately 20 suitably qualified individuals nationally. The same individual recruited as a Reservist
at the rank of staff officer (SO2), usually an O-4 equivalent, would instead be paid a daily rate of £91.81
($155),11 representing a considerable cost advantage
compared to the full rate the military would have to
pay if the individual were employed as an outside
consultant.
In terms of running costs of the unit as a whole,
the cost of Reserve Forces is considerably lower compared with Regular Forces. For example, in the UK, a
Reserve unit of comparable size to its regular counterpart costs approximately 20 percent of the latter’s
manpower bill when not mobilized. When mobilized,
a Reserve unit costs 10-15 percent less than its mobilized regular counterpart.12
Political:
Popular opinion continues to play a key role in warfare. “All warfare requires the political support and
consensus of the people in whose name it is waged.”13
As such, societal buy-in is key. Reserve Forces can be
seen as a gateway for the military to engage with many
different elements of society, including businesses
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who may be the employers of Reservists, as well as
their family and friends. Supporting and championing Reservists enables society to become more engaged with matters relating to defense. This is a view
shared by the United States, which forms the basis of
the Total Force Concept. General Creighton Abrams
intertwined the structure of the three components of
the Army in such a way as to make extended operations impossible, without the involvement of both the
Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. One
interpretation of General Abrams’ intent in doing so
was to ensure that no U.S. President should be able to
take the United States (and more specifically the U.S.
Army) to war without the support of the American
people.14
UK RESERVE FORCES
Thirty years ago, the UK’s Armed Forces were designed to fight a conventional war of national survival.
The principal role of the Reserve Forces was to provide
mass reinforcements to help counter the Soviet threat,
and there was little political appetite for their use in
any other contingency, such as the Falklands Conflict
in 1982.15 However, the end of the Cold War led to
the reduction in size of the Regular Forces, which in
turn led to an increase in the use of Reserve Forces
in operations such as the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Libya.16 Since April 1, 2003, 26,219 UK Reservists
(army, navy, and air force) have deployed globally, as
well as within the UK, in a variety of roles ranging
from infantryman to intelligence analyst.
Recent examples include Operation HERRICK in
Afghanistan, Operation TELIC in Iraq, and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,17 where
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Reservists made up approximately 15 percent of Defense’s contribution to safety and security.18 At their
peak in 2004, Reservists made up 20 percent of UK
forces in Iraq and 12 percent in Afghanistan.19 The
UK Army Reserve (formerly known as the Territorial
Army [TA]), produced almost one in 10 soldiers who
served in Afghanistan, a large proportion of which
were medical staff. A number of Reservists have been
decorated, and at least 27 have lost their lives.20 As
a result, the image of the TA as somewhere people
go to “play” soldier has begun to diminish in recent
years. However, the stigma attached to being “parttime” soldiers remains and needs to be addressed, as
rebranding alone is unlikely to achieve the necessary
shift in perception.
UK RESERVIST CATEGORIES
In recognition of differing circumstances and skill
sets, several categories of Reservists exist within the
UK. There are two principal categories of Reservists,
the Volunteer Reserves and the Ex-Regular Reserves.
Volunteer Reserves.
Volunteer Reserves are members of society who accept an annual training commitment and a liability to
be mobilized to deploy on operations. They comprise
the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve,
the Army Reserve, and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.
Reservists typically attend training on a part-time basis throughout the year, including an Annual Camp
which runs for approximately 2 weeks.21 Volunteer
Reserves are paid at the same rates as regular personnel and become eligible for an annual tax exempt
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bounty payment on completion of a specified amount
of training per year.22
As Volunteer Reserves are at a known level of
readiness, they are usually the first Reservists called
on for operations.23 In addition, a Volunteer Reservist
can sign a contract to undertake a full-time role for a
set period of time (Full-Time Reserve Service), a parttime or intermittent additional role (Additional Duties Commitment or an increased liability for call-out
when they have skills which may be needed at short
notice (High Readiness Reserves [HRR]).
Ex-Regular Reservists.
Ex-regular Reservists are former members of the
Regular Forces who retain a liability to be called up
for service. On completion of the period of liability for
recall, all become members of the Long-Term Reserve
up to the age of 55, or on completion of 18 years in the
Regular Reserve. The Long-Term Reserve may only be
recalled for national danger, great emergency, or attack on the UK. In general, ex-regular Reservists have
only been called upon to support routine operations if
they have volunteered or when volunteer Reservists
have not been available.24
High Readiness Reserves.
HRR were introduced in the Reserve Forces Act
1996 (RFA 96) and are drawn from both Ex-Regular
Reserves and Volunteer Reserves. They comprise individuals who may be trained to a higher standard
and are available for military service at an agreed
minimum notice, for which they receive an annual
payment. The agreement of the employer is required
before an individual can be accepted as an HRR.25
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Sponsored Reserves.
Sponsored Reserves (SRs) were created by RFA 96
in order to allow certain support tasks to be carried
out by trained professionals. They are members of a
civilian workforce who are required to join the volunteer or ex-regular Reserves as a condition of a contract,
which their civilian employer has entered into with
the MoD to provide a capability under normal conditions as well as on operations. Generally the MoD uses
SRs to fill capability gaps which they wish to control.
Among others, a number of discrete contracts have
been awarded for Heavy Equipment Tank Transportation, STUFT shipping,26 and the UK Meteorological
Office.27 Over 2,000 personnel hold SR status across a
range of military capabilities as diverse as fulfilling
the UK’s strategic sealift28 requirement,29 provision of
aviation weather services to the Royal Air Force (RAF)
and Army Air Corps, advising on environmental factors affecting operations,30 and meeting the Army’s
need for the transportation of heavy equipment.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE UK
RESERVE FORCES
In November 2012, the Independent Commission
to Review the UK’s Reserve Forces published its findings in a Green Paper31 having reached four main
conclusions. The first was that the UK Reserve Forces
were in decline; second, that the role of the Reservist needed to be modernized; third, that the potential
of Reserve Forces had not been fully harnessed; and
fourth, that they were not used in a cost-effective
manner.32 A public consultation followed, prompting
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over 3,000 responses, which in turn led to the publication of a UK Government white paper33 setting out the
future relationships MoD seeks with Reservists, their
employers, and society.34 The paper also introduced
the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme as part
of the wider Transforming Defence campaign that
aims to transform the UK Armed Forces and deliver
Future Force 2020.35
FR 2020 PROGRAMME
FR20 stipulates that by 2020, a greater proportion
of the overall Defense effort will be contributed by
the Reserves. In recognition of the decline in morale
among existing Reservists, coupled with the declining trend in recruitment, FR20 proposes to “revitalize” the role of Reservists through better training and
improved clarity of purpose, coupled with better integration with Regular Forces. In addition, the introduction of new legislation to better enable mobilization
was proposed, and the TA was renamed the “Army
Reserve,” to reflect the major changes to its role and
its integral place as part of the Whole Force concept.36
Furthermore, the importance of the relationship between the Reservist and their families and employers,
as well as society as a whole, in terms of both recruitment and retention, was recognized. As a result, the
program aims to further develop these relationships
with the aim of achieving further buy-in and support
through the introduction of the following measures.
Family.
Recent studies have shown that families play a
key role in the recruitment and retention of Reservist
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personnel and that family support is the biggest predictor of retention and readiness of Reservists.37 Reservist pay, although not a primary incentive for Reservists themselves, has been identified as playing an
important role in “sweetening” family relationships,
as it was frequently used as a negotiation tool to allow the Reservist to continue his or her service. For
example, Reservist pay was often presented as “extra
income” which could be used to pay for family holidays and home improvements, benefitting the family
as a whole.38 This is of particular relevance in the UK’s
high taxation, low disposable income societal environment, but similar factors could be expected to affect
U.S. Reservists from lower income brackets.
In recognition of the importance of pay as an incentive for both enrollment and continued service,
the total pay package for UK Reservists was recently
made more attractive. For example, the annual leave
entitlement was introduced in April 2013, amounting
to approximately 1 day’s paid leave for every 10 training days completed. This is paid in addition to the current annual leave awarded for time on deployment,
as well as the annual tax-free bounty.39 The program
rewards Reservists with high attendance, providing an incentive to continue their commitment year
after year.
In addition, in an attempt to encourage retention
of Reserve personnel on a long-term basis, pensions
for Reservists were introduced for the first time. As of
April 2015, when the new Armed Forces pension program comes into play, Reservists will accrue pension
entitlements for time spent training as well as when
mobilized. Other new financial incentives include the
Reservist Award which, in some circumstances, provides for payments to make up the difference between
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civilian earnings and military salary when a Reservist
is mobilized to ensure that the Reservist is not financially disadvantaged by mobilization.40
Employers.
The white paper also recognized the contribution
made by employers of Reservists, resulting in the
proposed introduction of a financial incentive of an
additional monthly payment of £500 for small- and
medium-sized enterprises when an employee is mobilized.41 In addition, FR20 recommended the use of
nonfinancial incentives such as a “kitemark-type”42
award for supportive employers,43 to provide appropriate recognition of the contribution those employers
make.44
However, these changes do not adequately address concerns expressed by employers in relation to
employee absence, which has been compared to maternity leave. In the UK, statutory maternity leave is
52 weeks,45 accompanied by statutory maternity pay,
which is paid up to 39 weeks.46 In addition, paternity
pay and leave is also available by law, albeit for a
shorter duration of time.47 One difference between absence due to maternity leave and military deployment
is the notice period given to employers. Maternity
leave typically starts with 4 to 6 months’ notice, whereas military deployment can take place with a typical 1
to 3 months of advance warning. Consultation with
employers highlighted that this shorter timescale was
problematic as it makes it more difficult to make arrangements to provide cover during the employee’s
absence. A further difference is in relation to risk, as
the possibility of the employee not returning at the
expected time due to medical reasons, or not at all, is
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considerably higher. The loss of a member of staff for
such long periods of time (temporary or permanent) is
even harder for small- and medium-sized enterprises
to accommodate, particularly if the employee concerned is highly skilled and hard to replace.48
At the same time, the consultations also revealed
that many employers acknowledged the potential
value that Reservists bring to their organization, in
terms of additional skills developed in the form of
leadership, people management, and initiative skills,
which benefit the civilian employer. This was felt to be
particularly relevant in the modern workplace, where
academic qualifications alone are no longer deemed
adequate, with employers increasingly seeking individuals with proven workplace skills such as team
working, leadership, and effective communications.49
Furthermore, a recent study conducted for MoD and
endorsed by the UK’s Chartered Management Institute, found that during a typical year, a Reservist
gained skills from military training that would cost
£8,327 ($14,156) for their civilian employers to buy.50
However, the majority of Reservists consulted reported that their role as a Reservist was at best tolerated by their employers, with the potential to damage
career progression, especially if there was a high probability that they would be mobilized. As a result, most
had downplayed their role as a Reservist or had avoided mentioning the subject at all to their employers or
colleagues. This was particularly true of individuals
in positions of seniority who were expected to have
a high commitment to their role, and were often required to work long, demanding hours. Furthermore,
many employers were likely to regard the Reservist’s
military commitments as being in direct conflict with
their ability to contribute fully to their civilian role.

13

As such, more work is needed to resolve these issues,
especially if the army is to utilize resources from the
high skilled end of the market.
SKEPTICISM OVER FR20
Although proposals put forward by FR20 have
been well received by many Reservists, considerable
skepticism also exists as to whether they are achievable. The UK’s National Audit Office, a government
oversight body, concluded in a highly critical report
entitled Army 2020 that there was no evidence that
“the feasibility of increasing the number of trained
Reserves within the planned timescale, needed to
provide the required capability, was robustly tested.”
The report also warned that the proposed changes in
the new Army structure come with significant further
risks, which if not mitigated “could significantly affect
value for money and the Army’s ability to achieve its
objectives.”51
The report found that “The Department [MoD] did
not test whether increasing the trained strength of the
Army Reserve to 30,000 was feasible” and that “the
Department’s recruitment targets for Reserves are not
underpinned by robust planning data.”52 Indeed, as
noted by Professor Vince Connelly of Oxford Brookes
University,53 any feasibility study may have been
irrelevant:
the final figure of 30K was actually imposed on the
Army by the FR20 Independent Commission and…
there was no choice about that figure at all. The Army
was given the figure of 30k once [the UK Government]
accepted the FR20 report.54
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Although the main purpose of the restructuring is
to reduce cost, the findings warn that “reducing the
size of the Army will not alone deliver the financial
savings required,” and that “greater reliance on Reserves will help the Department make savings but
may lead to increased costs for HM Treasury,” an apparent paradox explained by the UK’s system where
the MoD pays for soldiers in peacetime, but Treasury—central Government finance—pays for “wartime costs,” including the mobilization of Reserves. In
particular, “the Department did not fully assess the
value for money of its decision to reduce the size of
the Army.”55
What is of additional concern is that the Regular
Army is ahead of its target to reduce its uniformed personnel to 82,500 by 2018 and deliver the staffing savings required by its reduced budget, but at the same
time, the trained strength of the Army Reserve, which
is intended to compensate for this, has not increased
since April 2012 and the “recruitment of Reserve and
regular soldiers is behind the requirement set by the
Army for 2013-14.”56 The report also highlights that
“The Department failed to provide Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), infrastructure
critical to the success of the Army’s Recruiting Partnering Project with [outsourcing contractor] Capita,”
and consequently that “the Department’s failure to
enable the setting up of new recruitment software
has impacted on recruitment activities and increased
costs.”57
These concerns over the ability to recruit and retain the additional number of Reservists stipulated are
widespread, especially among currently serving Reservist personnel.58 Furthermore, even if the proposed
numbers are achieved, many also question whether
future Reserve Forces will be able to sufficiently bol15

ster the reduced Regular Force, not only in terms of
numbers, but capability.59
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION
Many believe that it is unrealistic to achieve
the proposed growth from a trained strength of approximately 20,00060 to 30,000 by 2018.61 The concern
is widespread and valid, given the declining trend in
recruitment reported in recent years. For example,
the number of volunteer Reserves (both trained and
untrained, to include officers and other ranks) was
34,730 in 2003. This figure fell to 30,220 in 2009 and
has steadily declined year after year to reach 26,500
in 2013.62 Some UK media reporting, considered misleading by MoD insiders, has highlighted that the
Army Reserves/TA are in “serious decline in terms
of numbers, capability and morale” and that “current
forecasts see the TA ageing and reducing to potentially unsustainable levels by 2015.”63
However, Professor Connelly is optimistic that it
would be possible to increase recruitment and points
out that the decline can be attributed to ongoing manning challenges resulting from decisions made during
the previous decade of sustained underfunding.
Lots of TA units [have] actually shrunk in terms of the
numbers they could recruit. . . . This reduction in posts
primarily fell on the top end of the rank pyramid so
that SNCO’s and officers were squeezed out of orbats
and so left. The number of TA staff posts also diminished over this period in certain areas. There seems to
be a collective forgetting of these various measures
over the years.64

An additional critical factor is that many Reservists
believe the recent increase of mandatory training days
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(MTDs) from 27 to 40 is not only unrealistic, given the
demands of their career and personal commitments,
but will result in serving members leaving, as well
as make the recruitment of new Reservists more difficult.65 In addition, the “one-size-fits-all” approach of
setting a standard number of MTDs was heavily criticized. Some felt that while the increase to 40 MTDs
would be welcomed by units such as the Officer Training Corps (OTC), others were already struggling to
meet the 27-day requirement. The OTC consists of
university students in full-time education, with long
holiday periods where they are actively looking for
paid work. As such, they not only have the time to
attend training days, but are likely to try to maximize
time spent with the OTC, as their pay as a Reservist is likely to be an important or even sole source
of income.
In comparison, Reservists who are doctors or senior managers of an organization are highly paid but
typically work demanding hours and already often
struggle to meet the former 27-MTD requirement.
Here, time is more valuable than pay, and as a result
many forego their tax free annual bounty.66 However,
the inability to attend training days does not mean that
they are less capable. This is especially true of medical
practitioners such as doctors, who are practicing their
trade in their civilian career on a daily basis.
RESERVE VERSUS REGULAR DEBATE
A further concern relates to whether Reservists,
even when they are able to meet the training requirements, are capable of replacing Regular soldiers. A
succession of planning decisions in the UK which
called for reducing its regular troop numbers from
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102,000 to 82,000, and attempting to replace the 20,000
regular troops with 30,000 Reservists has been met
with criticism.67 Despite planned investment of £1.8
billion (B) (U.S.$3.06B) over 10 years to enhance the
capability and strength of Reserve Forces and better
integrate them with the Regular Army,68 many critics
remain concerned about the impact of replacing a fulltime soldier with a part-time Reservist.69 According to
one former soldier who served in the Regular Army:
“We now have far too few people to do the role. We’re
relying too heavily on the TA or Reservists, as they’ve
tried to rebrand them. And it’s not working.”70
This is a view that is shared by many. Similar concerns with respect to the ability of Reserves to perform
to the necessary standards have also been raised in the
United States. For example, Colonel Ted Spain, deployed to Iraq as the commander of the 18th Military
Police Brigade in 2003, believes that the decision to
deploy Army Reserve Officer Brigadier General Janis
Karpinski to command the military police unit at the
Abu Ghraib Prison was one of the key U.S. mistakes
made during the Iraq war.71
In addition, Army Quadrennial Defense Review director Major General John Rossi has also recently
questioned aspects of the National Guard’s combat
performance since September 11, 2001 (9/11).72 These
views were shared by retired U.S. Army Reserves Colonel Patrick Allen73 who observed during his 21 years
of service that: “. . . Regular soldiers are almost always
better qualified than the National Guard or Reservists,
due to the differences in the number of training hours
as well as resources such as training ammunition.”74
At the same time, Colonel Allen also highlighted
that Reservists with specialist skill sets, who perform
similar or identical roles in their civilian occupation,
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often perform better in that role compared to their
Regular military counterpart. This is predominantly
because these individuals benefit from military training as well as, not instead of, civilian training. In addition, they have developed their knowledge and trade
through practical/operational experience both in and
out of uniform.
Giving the examples of the use of fuel truck operators and cyber experts, Allen argues that one advantage of the Reserves and the National Guard is that
when specialists are required, the existence of already
trained personnel means that the Army does not need
to invest in training from scratch. In other words, remedial training can be provided to get the Reserve
and Guard Units to the desired level of training much
more quickly than starting from no unit at all.
The same situation applies in the UK where Reserve personnel undergo intensive mobilization training prior to deployment. According to former infantry
officer Major (Ret.) Anthony Ball, this is adequate to
enable soldiers to reach the necessary level of proficiency equal to that of their Regular counterparts. Ball,
who has 20 years of service in both the Regular Army
and the Reserves, argues that although there may be
some Reservists who fail to come up to scratch, this is
equally true of soldiers in the Regular Army.
Overall, recent operational tours have shown that
the performance of Reservists has not been an issue,
and that they have worked well alongside the Regular Army once they have had an opportunity to prove
their professionalism and capabilities in the field.
However, despite evidence of the ability of Reserve
Forces to perform satisfactorily in operations, there
continues to be a belief that Reservists do not possess
the same level of professionalism and skills. The subject deserves closer examination to determine wheth19

er this is a justifiable concern, or mere prejudice that
needs to be overcome.
PERCEPTION OF THE PART-TIME
PROFESSIONAL
There is a perception among the Regular Army
that Reserve Forces cannot be regarded as fellow professionals. This arises because the full time element
of the Army defines who is a professional by judgment against full-time norms. For example, an Army
professional is someone who demonstrates a strong
commitment and 24/7 availability to the organization. Thus, individuals who do not show they work
full-time hours and are not available 24/7 (i.e., who
are part-time) will be seen as not wholly committed
and so will be perceived as less professional in their
status, no matter how well they may perform in their
roles.75 However, this view is not unique to the armed
forces.76 Full-time employees in other professions such
as the police also struggle to view their part-time colleagues as true professionals.77 This is also reported to
be the case with respect to professions where the initial training or education has been equivalent. Examples include doctors, nurses and accountants, where
the employee have reduced their hours from full-time
to part-time.78
Peter Quinn, Research Fellow in Military Sciences
at British defense and security think-tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),79 goes as far as to dismiss
the fundamental principles behind the Whole Force
Concept, arguing that the implication of the “integrated” and “single force” command slogans, that Reservists are equivalent to their regular counterparts, is a
myth. Quinn believes that regular capabilities cannot
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be replicated on a part-time basis, and compares the
Reservists 40-MTDs to the regulars’ 223 annual working days. He further argues that “. . . those who claim
otherwise discredit the professionalism of regulars
and place unrealistic expectations on Reservists.”80
There is clearly a valid argument that, if an individual has received less training than another in an
equivalent position, that the ability of that individual
to perform will be less than his or her better trained
counterpart. The argument becomes stronger if the
training provided is inferior. However, although this
may be the case in some Reservist roles, this is not true
in all cases. Furthermore, one “Reserve” training day
does not necessarily equate to one “Regular” working
day. For example, the Reserve training day is generally more intense, and, unlike regular soldiers, many
Reservists are required to complete various tasks
such as personal administration relating to the military, physical fitness training, and coursework preparation on their own unpaid time, outside reported
“training” hours.
At the same time, the key differential between the
Army Reserve and Regular Army is that for most Reservists, the army is not his or her sole career. In fact,
many do not view their role as a Reservist as a career.
Although there is considerable evidence to illustrate
that Reservists are capable of performing well, and are
able to contribute significantly to the overall Defense
effort, it must also be recognized that the Reservist’s
main priority is likely to be his or her day job. It is
perhaps this fact that will always differentiate Reserve
Forces from the Regular Military. Nevertheless, the
following case studies illustrate the valuable contribution that Reserve Forces currently make and will continue to make for the foreseeable future, which needs
to be recognized.
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CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1: The Medical Corps.
In the British Army, core health and medical services are provided by the Royal Army Medical Corps
(RAMC). The majority of RAMC Reservists ordinarily
work for the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK.
Currently there are over 2,000 NHS staff serving as
Reservists.81 The NHS as an employer is a supporter of
Reserve Forces, making the recruitment and retention
of Reservists less challenging. Furthermore, as their
“day” job is to work in the medical services, typically
as doctors or nurses, the argument that they are less
professional or experienced compared to their regular
counterpart cannot hold true. Despite this, Medical
Corps Reservists deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan
reported receiving considerable skepticism from their
Regular counterparts.
The view that field hospitals run by Reservists
were somehow inferior to those run by regulars came
not only from regular RAMC personnel, but also from
the injured soldiers who were admitted into those
hospitals.82 But despite their initial apprehension on
learning that the Reservists were mostly NHS staff in
their “day” jobs, the injured soldiers soon reported
that they felt that they were in even better hands. This
was because many viewed NHS care to be better than
that of the military. This resulted partly from the general positive image of the NHS in British society, but
also from the soldiers’ belief that by receiving both civilian and military training and education, the Reservists benefited from superior training and experience
and a wider breadth of knowledge.
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In this situation, while the doctors and nurses may
only be part-time in terms of their military commitments, they are full-time medical professionals, and
so the argument that they are somehow less professional than their regular counterparts clearly does not
apply. Furthermore, even when the Reservist’s main
career was not in medicine, it is questionable as to
whether he or she was less skilled than a regular Medic/Combat Medical Technician (CMT). For example,
some Reservists who serve as Medics in a noncommissioned role often hold highly skilled jobs in their
civilian life. Some are senior managers in their own
professions, who are not only well-qualified academically, but have a broad range of practical management
skills which can be used effectively in their role as an
Army Medic.
Specialists.
The medical profession is not the only field where
specialist civilian skills can be utilized by the military. Military Intelligence is another example where
specialists play a key role. At the heart of intelligence is analysis.83 The importance for the analyst to
not only possess general analytical capabilities, but
also in-depth specialist knowledge, was acknowledged in the UK Government’s Butler Report84
in 2004:
Analysis can be conducted only by people expert in
the subject matter—a severe limitation when the topic
is as specialised as biological warfare or uranium enrichment, or the internal dynamics of terrorist cells or
networks85
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The Butler report further cautioned that a “special
danger here can be the failure to recognise just what
particular expertise is required.”86 In other words, it
requires an individual with specialist knowledge to
understand the problem in order to be able to recommend additional expertise required. This observation
highlights the importance of involving specialists in
the operational role of the headquarters element to ensure that any force generated has the correct experts.
Against this background, the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review recognized both the importance of “understanding” and the cost-benefits that
could be realized through the use of Reservists.87
Reserve Forces have the flexibility to be mobilized
and deployed, unlike their civilian counterparts in
government service. This has resulted in the birth of
the concept of the SGMI, a deployable cadre of deep
specialists that can provide technical expertise across
a wide spectrum of disciplines in support of both
national and operational objectives.88
Case Study 2: Specialist Group Military
Intelligence.
In recognition that “Analysis can be conducted
only by people expert in the subject matter,”89 the formation of the Specialist Group Military Intelligence
(SGMI) was announced in a UK Ministerial Statement
on Reserves in 2013. The Group’s remit is to extend
the capability available to defense forecasting, intelligence, and understanding through cost-effective access to the breadth and depth of specialist intelligence,
scientific, and technical expertise available through
the Army Reserve. Its work falls under the banner of
technical intelligence (TECHINT) which is defined as:
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intelligence concerning foreign [or nonstate actor]
technological developments, and the performance and
operational capabilities of foreign [or nonstate actor]
materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes.90

Although such a capability was developed during
World War II, this had lapsed, and in recent times until the formation of SGMI, the British Army had no
central repository of specialist intelligence personnel.
SGMI is an independent Army Reserve unit under
the operational command and administrative control
of 1 Military Intelligence Brigade, but is expected to
migrate to the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade when this formation is stood up. The
Unit will eventually consist of three pillars: Technical
Intelligence Specialists Organisation (TISO); Human
Domain Intelligence Specialists (HDIS), and Regional
and Thematic Intelligence Specialists (RTIS). A headquarters element will also be established to provide
the command and staff elements to enable tasking and
force generation.
Technical Intelligence Staff Organisation: The Technical Intelligence Staff Organisation (TISO) will evolve
directly from the existing Technical Intelligence Staff
Officers pool. The brand name TISO will endure, although Officer will be changed to Organisation to reflect the inclusion of warrant officers for the first time.
The new sections retain the traditional specialism
of the former pool: materiel and personnel exploitation; weapons, ordnance, munitions and explosives
(WOME); military systems and chemical, biological,
radiation and nuclear. In addition, an infrastructure
and environment section will be included to provide
understanding of critical infrastructure. The new TISO
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will triple the size of the former pool with the distribution of manpower reflecting Defense priorities. As
such, WOME, is likely to be the largest at present. In
addition, the HDIS and RTIS pillars will enhance the
capabilities of SGMI to provide expert coverage of disciplines not traditionally associated with TISO.
Human Domain Intelligence Specialists: The Human Domain Intelligence Specialists (HDIS) areas of
expertise will include technical networks; social networks; governance (political “science” and economics) and human science (including ergonomics and
psychology).
Regional and Thematic Intelligence Specialists: Regional and Thematic Intelligence Specialists (RTIS),
the third pillar, is to have two regional sections to foreign area specialists. A thematic section will provide
expertise in areas such as criminology, finance, narcotics, and terrorism. The composition of this section
is likely to be highly flexible to reflect strategic and
operational priorities.
The proposed composition of SGMI reflects an
appreciation of the likely character of future conflict
and the role that understanding will play in it.91 Current UK doctrine notes that understanding, the foresight that arises from the application of judgment to
situational analysis, in future conflict will be achieved
through a deep appreciation of the human domain
framework.92 It is clear that specialist intelligence is
a key enabler in delivering timely understanding of
the future battle space and the new Reservist SGMI is
well placed to provide this capability in a cost-effective and timely manner that would be unlikely to be
provided through the regular Army or private sector.
At the same time, it must be recognized that SGMI is
currently in its early stages of development and faces

26

a number of challenges which it must overcome if it is
to fully realize its potential.
CHALLENGES
The future success of any of the specialist units in
the Reserves depends upon their ability to identify
and recruit suitably qualified personnel. Furthermore,
they must do so without compromising on the quality
of their specialist personnel, as so doing will result in
a loss of credibility. As such, the following challenges
need to be recognized and addressed.
Challenge 1: How Do You Find the Right Person?
The reputation of these units relies heavily on the
credibility of the expert in the eye of the customer.
This usually requires professional recognition at a national or international level. However, it is not always
easy to determine the reputation of an expert if expertise does not already exist, making the assessment of
the suitability of a candidate difficult. A starting point
is to recruit individuals with a relevant higher degree
from a reputable university, coupled with fellowship
or chartered membership of a relevant professional
body or a suitable employment record. The majority
of serving officers in these roles already meet these
criteria, and are either employed in a consultancy role
outside the military, or in the case of medical specialists, usually within the NHS.
Challenge 2: How Do You Successfully Recruit
that Individual?
Even when a suitable candidate is located, the next
challenge is how to recruit that individual who is un27

likely to be looking for additional work, especially if
he or she is successful in their own career. As noted
earlier, pay is not the primary motivator for Reservists. At the same time, all Reservists consulted stated
that they would not serve without financial compensation. Furthermore, although the motivation for Reservists to join Reserve Forces varied from individual
to individual, most agreed that they would not have
joined if they felt that serving as a Reservist would
damage their main career. This is even more relevant
for potential recruits into units such as SGMI where
there is a close overlap between the role and function
of their main career and their work as a Reservist.
For example, if a business manager in civilian life
is an infantryman, the two careers are quite separate.
Apart from time needed for training and deployment
on operations, the Reservist is likely to develop additional skills such as leadership, which he or she
will bring back. As such, this is a positive relationship. However, if you have a SME in Terrorism, for
example, their work as a Reservist has the potential of
having a direct impact on their main career due to the
similarity of the work.
One potential concern relates to professional status, which in turn is closely related to pay. As an SME,
the daily rate is important, not so much in terms of the
actual amount paid, but more as a reflection of your
worth. In other words, the pay rate is an indicator of
status used to demonstrate the level of professional
recognition. For example, the résumé of an SME may
indicate qualifications equivalent to the rank of Colonel in a civil service role. However, if that individual
is recruited as a far lower rank, such as a Captain, the
implication is that the individual is not a true expert.
Another concern is in relation to travel. If the SME
is internationally recognized, it is likely that their work
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will require international travel, often at short notice.
Existing military bureaucracy requires individuals to
request and be granted authorization prior to international travel. This is not a realistic expectation as such
a restriction will damage the SME’s ability to carry out
his or her main job, and as such, could well deter that
individual from joining as a Reservist.
Challenge 3: Security Clearance.
A challenge relating to the recruitment of specialists is security clearance in those areas where higher
level clearances may be required. Traditionally, recruitment of specialists was restricted to experienced
staff officers with a specialist qualification who at the
same time held developed vetting clearance (an approximate UK equivalent of top secret/sensitive compartmented information [TS/SCI] clearance). However, this becomes a real challenge if the specialism
required is a Pashto93 speaker with the Waneci94 dialect who has an in-depth understanding of not only
the language but the local culture, which must be current. As the individual will be working with sensitive
material, he or she must be capable of obtaining the
necessary security clearances. The first requirement
for obtaining such security clearances is that the individual must be a British national.
However, the challenge is in finding an individual
who has been born and bred in the UK with the necessary local knowledge and skills, who not only has
the ability to translate, but the ability to fully appreciate the nuances of the language. There may be fluent
speakers of Pashto trained by the military. However,
the limitations of an individual with 1 year of training
in Pashto and a short course on Afghan culture at the
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Defence Centre for Languages and Culture must be
understood. These individuals are typically used in
operations as translators and are trained to be able to
hold basic conversations with the local populace without offending them too much. However, what will be
required from a specialist is an individual with a far
more sophisticated knowledge of the language and
culture. In other words, you need someone who is a
native. This is not currently possible given the restrictions relating to security clearance, which the army
needs to consider how to address.
Challenge 4: How Do You Retain the Expertise?
Even when a suitable candidate has been successfully recruited, the next potential challenge is retention. Recent studies and consultations have highlighted that wastage is at its highest between the period of
enrollment and initial training. According to Professor Connelly, who conducted research into wastage
of Reserve personnel, the patterns are similar to gym
memberships. The initial period shortly after joining
is important as this is where the new member is “trying out” the gym to access suitability. Any negative
experiences during this period are likely to deter that
individual from continuing his or her membership.
The same situation applies to Reservists, in that the
impression of the army given at the initial stage, to
include administrative procedures such as medicals,
issuing of uniforms, and basic training, will have a
profound impact on whether that recruit continues
the training. Interviews conducted not only with staff
from specialist National Reserve units, but also with
infantry regiments and Medical Corps personnel, all
indicated that this initial stage was a real problem,
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where they were struggling to maintain recruits. The
reason provided by all consulted was administrative
blunders and the poor quality of training, which had
been outsourced in an effort to cut costs. Crucially, this
is also reported to be the case for the Regular Army.95
As such, the cost benefit of outsourcing needs to be
assessed with extreme caution.
Dangers of Outsourcing.
The benefit of outsourcing as a means of controlling and minimizing cost is well established. There are
examples (see section on Sponsored Reserves) where
outsourcing has worked well. At the same time, the
outsourcing of recruitment has been a disaster for the
UK armed forces, to include the Regular Army. For
example, the main objective of the UK’s 10-year, £440
million (M) (U.S.$748M) deal to privatize recruitment
was to enable a saving of £300 million (U.S.$510M).
However, this has resulted in a sharp drop in the
number of recruits. In October 2013, the Defense Correspondent for the UK’s influential Daily Telegraph
newspaper reported that: “. . . the Army is facing a
recruitment crisis after a cost-cutting outsourcing
deal resulted in the number of people joining up falling by more than a third.”96 Figures obtained by the
newspaper showed that the number of people attending Army interviews and selection tests to be regular
soldiers had fallen by 35 percent since Capita, a contracting and services corporation, had taken over recruitment. According to one senior infantry regiment
source, “What this has done is completely erode an effective system. Although it delivers savings, it doesn’t
deliver a result.”97
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Just as in the Regular Army, within the Army Reserves numerous problems have arisen over the administration of new recruits as well as basic training,
which has also been outsourced to a private contractor. According to one Staff Officer at 256 Field Hospital, “Outsourcing has been a nightmare and a total disaster. We’ve lost a lot of recruits who just had enough
and decided not to proceed with their enrollment and
basic training.”98
Examples provided include a series of administrative blunders such as a new recruit turning up on a
specified date and time to be issued his or her uniform, only to find that the relevant person in charge of
issuing uniforms (from the outsourced company) was
unavailable that day. Typically, the individual would
be told to return on another day, which was problematic as appointments have to be made during normal
working hours, requiring the recruit to take further
time off work. While a recruit may be prepared to take
one day off, repeated blunders eating into limited
vacation time form an early impression that the organization they are in the process of joining lacks basic
competence—enough in some cases for the recruit to
withdraw their application altogether.99
Another commonly reported problem was difficulty in completing medical examinations, a prerequisite
of the recruit being allowed to begin basic training.
The process was reported to have become so cumbersome and time-consuming as a result of outsourcing, that many recruits were reported to have given
up and decided not to continue with their service in
the Reserves.
The same complaints were voiced by Reservists in
all branches, whether in combat arms such as infantry or technical corps such as the RAMC, Intelligence,
and so on. This highlights the need when considering
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outsourcing to focus on value for money as opposed
to cost reduction alone.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the on-going climate of economic austerity,
the pressure to cut defense spending and achieve more
for less cost is likely to continue into the foreseeable
future. As a result, the use and reliance on Reserve
Forces is likely to increase. The argument for the use
of Reserve Forces is not only their affordability compared to Regular Forces, but also the ability to access
relevant specialist skills which are currently either not
widely available or entirely unavailable within the
Regular Army. An added advantage is that Reservists
serve as a gateway to wider society, enabling political
buy-in for matters relating to defense through family,
friends and employers of Reservists.
Cost Cutting Initiatives.
With on-going pressure to reduce defense spending, new cost reduction initiatives are likely to be of
interest to the United States. Here, the UK may serve
as a valid case study, as it has been able to carry out
operations at a fraction of the U.S. budget. As such, the
United States may look to the UK for other models, as
well as to see how these initiatives have worked, in
order to be able to make an assessment of the likelihood for success if similar measures are adopted
in the United States. Outsourcing is a case in point
where the United States may wish to explore why
some measures have worked, while others have been
counterproductive.
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The U.S. defense budget is considerably bigger
than the UK defense budget. As a result, the United
States can afford a degree of personnel specialization
which the UK simply cannot. This is exemplified at
both unit and individual level, and is typified in the
much broader range of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) in the U.S. military, reflecting a narrower
skill range within each MOS.100 To take just one example, the U.S. Army’s Career Management Field 94
“Electronic Maintenance and Calibrations” includes
a multiplicity of MOS,101 some specializing in single
weapons systems. In the British Army, by contrast,
these all come under the single multi-skilled “trade”
of Electronics Artificer, which requires a higher education degree before progression to the rank of Staff
Sergeant (E-7 equivalent). In short, a vastly smaller
budget has resulted in soldiers being required to be
far more omni-competent in the UK. The British skill
and specialty distribution model may therefore provide a useful case study if continuing financial pressure forces the U.S. Army to examine new areas where
costs can be reduced.
At the same time, the need to re-establish specialist human domain skills to address new security challenges applies to both the UK and the United States.
As such, a re-establishment is a long-term process best
achieved in the short term through the use of high
level, internationally recognized SMEs recruited as
Reservists. Here the SGMI model, which is still in its
infancy, may prove useful. The United States is also
better placed to effectively establish such a unit, as
the U.S. budget is much less restrictive than that of
the UK.
Nevertheless the limitations of the use of Reserve
Forces must also be understood. Various challenges
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have been identified in this monograph in relation
to the recruitment and retention of Reservists in the
UK. In order to establish and maintain Reserve Forces
that are fit for purpose to tackle the asymmetric threat
environment of the 21st century, the UK needs to understand and tackle effectively the following specific
challenges, which can also be translated to the U.S.
planning environment:
Cultural Change.
The perception that Reserve Forces are inferior to
the Regular Army is unlikely to change in the immediate future. In some cases, the perception is justified,
as the training provided to some Reservists is inferior
in terms of quality as well as quantity. However, this
does not apply to specialists, where the perception is
based on prejudice and lack of knowledge as to what
the specialists are capable of and how they contribute
to the defense effort.
Recommendations: In the case of Reservists with
specialist skills, prejudice can be overcome by first
establishing effective and fully operational specialist
units; and second, by educating the Regular Army as
to their purpose and function. Over time, these units
could be seen as distinctive and valuable entities that
bring value added to military operations. To achieve
this, the recruitment of the right caliber of specialists is
key. Counterintuitively, specialists should continue to
be viewed as being different to the Regular Army, and
their purpose being to fill a gap in skill sets as opposed
to being part-time soldiers trying to fill a Regular Soldier’s job. In relation to nonspecialists, prejudice can
best be minimized through better training and integration with the Regular Army.
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Training.
Although there are numerous examples to illustrate that Reserve Forces are capable of achieving the
necessary standards of skills and professionalism,
this can only be achieved when sufficient high quality
training is provided.
Recommendation: Integrate training with Regular
Forces where possible. This is best achieved when a
Reserve Unit is structured so that it is directly in support of a parent Regular Unit. Currently, Regular Soldiers do not work evenings or weekends for training
purposes, which is when the majority of the Reservists’ training takes place. However, it is possible to
integrate annual training camps and elements of trade
courses to enable Reservists to appreciate what the
required standard is in the Regular Army.
Furthermore, consideration should be given as to
whether the Regular Army would be able to be more
flexible with respect to their working hours. If Regular
soldiers expected to work with Reservists were able
to work 1 weekend every other month and therefore
synchronize training elements with those Reservists,
this would dramatically enhance the effort to integrate
training. Existing negativity and prejudice on the
part of the Regular Army toward the Reserve Forces
at the present moment in time would make this difficult to achieve. However, efforts need to be made to
overcome this.
Specialists.
The need for training does not apply to the same
extent for specialists, such as doctors and SMEs. Here
too, however, the ongoing stigma attached to being a
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Reservist needs to be overcome. There are also numerous challenges relating to the service contracts of specialist personnel, such as rank, travel restrictions and
security clearance, which need to be addressed.
Recommendation: Better integration with the Regular Army is necessary to enable the value of specialists
to be better recognized. Standard Operating Procedures relating to security clearance, authorization for
travel, and rank need to be re-examined to ensure that
the flexibility is available to enable the highest caliber
of personnel to be recruited and retained, and to ensure that the SME’s career does not suffer as a result of
his or her Reserve service.
Motivation—Incentives versus Disincentives.
With the exception of Reservists serving on a fulltime basis, the Reservist is not economically reliant on
the Army as they will have their own career outside
the military. As such, the balance between incentives
and disincentives plays a crucial role in the recruitment and retention of Reservists.
Recommendation: Efforts must be made to understand what the real incentives and disincentives are
and to ensure that the former outweigh the latter. In
other words, the motivation of Reservists, their families and employers needs to be better understood. In
addition, a flexible approach is necessary to accommodate the needs of widely varying Reservists and
the very different posts which they are intended to
fill, and a one-size-fits-all approach to training must
be avoided.

37

Dangers of Outsourcing.
In an attempt to control and cut costs, outsourcing
to the private sector is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. However, lessons from the UK have
shown that while some outsourcing programs have
been successful, others have been nothing short of
disastrous.
Recommendation: Based on the UK’s experience, the
single most important recommendation of this monograph is that cost must no longer be the only criterion
for determining value. Instead, further consideration
of the quality of output is essential. In addition, in each
case, a feasibility study should be conducted to assess
the likely outcome of outsourcing with reference to
the individuals on the ground who will be impacted
by the change and to senior military personnel, as well
as the administrators and budget personnel currently
consulted.
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